Risk dominance

Results: 136



#Item
21LOCAL UTILITY AND MULTIVARIATE RISK AVERSION ARTHUR CHARPENTIER, ALFRED GALICHON, AND MARC HENRY Abstract. We revisit Machina’s local utility as a tool to analyze attitudes to multivariate risks. Using martingale embed

LOCAL UTILITY AND MULTIVARIATE RISK AVERSION ARTHUR CHARPENTIER, ALFRED GALICHON, AND MARC HENRY Abstract. We revisit Machina’s local utility as a tool to analyze attitudes to multivariate risks. Using martingale embed

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Source URL: www.istfin.eco.usi.ch

Language: English - Date: 2013-04-05 05:27:37
22Why Scientists Chase Big Problems: Individual Strategy and Social Optimality∗ Carl T. Bergstrom1 , Jacob G. Foster2 , and Yangbo Song3 1  Department of Biology, University of Washington

Why Scientists Chase Big Problems: Individual Strategy and Social Optimality∗ Carl T. Bergstrom1 , Jacob G. Foster2 , and Yangbo Song3 1 Department of Biology, University of Washington

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Source URL: octavia.zoology.washington.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-05-19 01:52:32
23Unit Vector Games Rahul Savani∗ Bernhard von Stengel†  arXiv:1501.02243v3 [cs.GT] 14 Feb 2016

Unit Vector Games Rahul Savani∗ Bernhard von Stengel† arXiv:1501.02243v3 [cs.GT] 14 Feb 2016

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2016-03-26 12:48:17
24Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game∗ Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email

Exponentially Many Steps for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Bimatrix Game∗ Rahul Savani and Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email

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Source URL: www.cdam.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2004-05-13 14:39:39
25Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March, 2006), 397–429  HARD-TO-SOLVE BIMATRIX GAMES BY RAHUL SAVANI AND BERNHARD VON STENGEL1 The Lemke–Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bim

Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March, 2006), 397–429 HARD-TO-SOLVE BIMATRIX GAMES BY RAHUL SAVANI AND BERNHARD VON STENGEL1 The Lemke–Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bim

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2006-03-03 11:56:34
26Int J Game Theory: 359–369 DOIs001820400167 Symmetry and p-Stability Srihari Govindan1 , Arndt von Schemde2;3 and Bernhard von Stengel2 1

Int J Game Theory: 359–369 DOIs001820400167 Symmetry and p-Stability Srihari Govindan1 , Arndt von Schemde2;3 and Bernhard von Stengel2 1

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Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2004-07-14 06:57:05
27History-Dependent Risk Aversion and the Reinforcement Effect∗ Gerelt Tserenjigmid† - Job Market Paper November 5, 2015

History-Dependent Risk Aversion and the Reinforcement Effect∗ Gerelt Tserenjigmid† - Job Market Paper November 5, 2015

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Source URL: www.econ.vt.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-02-16 12:41:57
28International Journal of Industrial Organization–162 www.elsevier.com / locate / econbase Risk dominance selects the leader: An experimental analysis

International Journal of Industrial Organization–162 www.elsevier.com / locate / econbase Risk dominance selects the leader: An experimental analysis

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Source URL: www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2015-05-12 10:02:49
    29The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information∗ Tim Roughgarden† April 18, 2014 Abstract We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an “extension theorem” for

    The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information∗ Tim Roughgarden† April 18, 2014 Abstract We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an “extension theorem” for

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    Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2014-04-19 00:58:55
    30The trouble with trembles in the market entry game: Reverberating noisy best response and scale illusion Daniel K. Saunders∗ University of California, Santa Barbara September 2014

    The trouble with trembles in the market entry game: Reverberating noisy best response and scale illusion Daniel K. Saunders∗ University of California, Santa Barbara September 2014

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    Source URL: dl.dropboxusercontent.com

    Language: English